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At times, a jurist can be a Renaissance thinker whose
breadth of vision makes it possible to take all genuine issues
into account. Such a person can achieve far-reaching objectives
without causing antagonism by calling upon wide perspectives
and taking all genuine needs into consideration.
A trial court judge who sees far enough ahead can affect the
future of the law as profoundly as a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. Even more importantly, such a judge can affect
people's lives through a contagious example.
Vincent L. Broderick, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York from 1976 to 1995 was such a
judge. Although he sought no fanfares or laurels, he deserves
high recognition from the public and the Bar.
* Richard A. Givens was a law clerk for Judge Broderick from March 1992
until Judge Broderick's untimely death on March 3, 1995. Prior to that, Givens
was a Regional Director for the Federal Trade Commission (1971-1977) and Chair
of the New York State Bar Association's Task Force on Simplification of the Law
(1985-1989). Givens first met Judge Broderick as a rookie prosecutor while Brod-
erick was the Chief Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of
New York in 1991. Much of the material for this article is based on talks with
Judge Broderick conducted over the course of that relationship.
1
PACE LAW REVIEW
I. A Natural Justice Judge Who Followed Technical Rules
Judge Broderick was a stickler for technical correctness in
his decisions. He believed that this was entirely consistent with
finding a way to achieve justice in each case. In his view, if a
result appeared unfair, that was because the truly applicable
rule had not yet been found. Legal principles were not syllogis-
tic in nature, yielding a single inevitable result in each in-
stance. Rather, applicable rules were pulled into the center of
consideration by the facts of the case in a manner similar to
gravitational attraction:
Fidelity to the law must be combined with sensitivity to indi-
vidual circumstances .... This is a preeminent reason for the
universally recognized need for a separate and independent judi-
ciary in civilized society.
In law as elsewhere, wise choices can rarely be made through
mechanical, straight-line syllogistic logic. Multiple factors are al-
most always involved. Jurists must search for relevant sources of
guidance wherever they can be found: they must consider appli-
cable statutes and rules, the conduct of the actors in the situa-
tions before them, and the impact of that conduct upon others.
They must consider the potential effect upon various fields of ac-
tivity of the decisions they propose to make.'
Always desirous of sidestepping the trap of "delusive exact-
ness,"2 Judge Broderick interpreted documents, be they con-
tracts, statutes, constitutional provisions, or legal concepts,3
based upon the principles laid down by Chief Justice Stone: "To
decide [it] we turn to the words ... read in their historical set-
ting as revealing the purposes of the framers, and search for
admissible meanings of [the] words which, in the circumstances
of their application, will effectuate those purposes."4
1. Vincent L. Broderick, Local Factors in Sentencing, 5 FEDERAL SENTENCING
REPORTER 314, 316 (May/June 1993).
2. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342-43 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Ass'n v. Coaxial Communications, 799 F.
Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), later ruling 807 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying
the concept of shared responsibility to an alleged breach of contract if each side
contributed to the breakdown of negotiations to implement a preliminary
agreement).
4. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317-18 (1941), quoted in Vincent L.




Judge Broderick passionately believed in the importance of
adhering to rules of law, rather than personal predilections.
For that very reason, he sought to grant all of the rules their
full majesty. Thus, he gave as much weight to Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which commands courts to
seek the "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action,"5 and to the harmless error principle of Rule 61,6 as he
did to any more detailed provision. This vision of the law
guided all of his decisions and the performance of his duties as
an Article III jurist. Some may see this approach as less of a
technical than a literalistic interpretation. Judge Broderick,
however, believed that his approach, also that of Chief Justice
Stone, was the only truly technical one because it respected the
documents being interpreted.
Judge Broderick also recognized that appellate decisions
are not always representative of the bulk of events occurring in
courts of first impression or outside the framework of the legal
system. Consequently, Judge Broderick felt no hesitation in
breaking new ground based on the "steady pressure of facts and
events,"7 whether or not supported by explicit appellate
authority.8
A. Dignity for All
Judge Broderick's contributions draw upon the basic under-
pinnings of our legal structure as celebrated in the Declaration
of Independence: respect for every human being without excep-
tion of any kind.9
As New York City Police Commissioner, Vincent Broderick
honored the good work of the officers of the Department, while
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 61. The court must disregard any error which does not af-
fect the substantial rights of the parties. Id.
7. Harlan F. Stone, LAw AND ITs ADMINIsTRATION 39 (1915).
8. See United States v. Zanfrandino, 833 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (hold-
ing that defense counsel should see all papers prepared by a government expert in
connection with case). Judge Broderick also recognized the distortion of perception
of the law when a large majority of appellate decisions are unpublished. See
Cecere v. County of Westchester, 814 F. Supp. 378, 380 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Schue-
ler v. Roman Asphalt, 837 F. Supp. 247, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).




making it clear that ethnic discrimination would not be toler-
ated in the force. He told his supervisors:
If you will tolerate ... one attitude toward a white citizen who
speaks English, and a different attitude toward another citizen
who is a Negro or speaks Spanish - get out right now .... If you
do not realize the incendiary potential in a racial slur, if you will
tolerate . . the racial slur - get out right now.10
As commissioner, Broderick assumed responsibility for po-
licing the police, and was himself a civilian reviewer of police
behavior. For that very reason, he opposed Mayor John Lind-
say's 1966 proposal for creation of a police review board com-
posed entirely of civilians. Mindful of the risk of polarization
among ethnic groups generated by this issue, Broderick led in
the creation of the Community-Wide Panel for a Better City."
The panel was composed of more than 300 civic leaders, includ-
ing both leading protagonists and opponents of Lindsay's propo-
sal.12 This coalition contributed to defusing the police review
board controversy because of its wide representation and its fo-
cus on issues other than police review.' 3
Meanwhile, Broderick put flesh on the concept of collegial-
ity by initiating regularly scheduled meetings with leaders of
the many ethnically or religiously oriented organizations within
10. Lawrence VanGelder, Vincent Broderick, Federal Judge, Is Dead at 74,
N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 1995, at D20.
11. The other participants included Bernard Jackson, then Executive Director
of Lindsay's Civilian Complaint Review Board; Harold Baer, Jr., former Executive
Director of that body and later a United States District Judge; State Senator (later
the Secretary of State of the State of New York) Basil A. Paterson; New York As-
semblyman and later Congressman Charles B. Rangel; Father Joseph Gleeson of
St. Thomas the Apostle Church; Rev. David Cockeraft of the University Heights
Presbyterian Church; Rabbi Ely Pilshik; Rev. Lawrence E. Beebe, Unitarian
Church of All Souls; and Franklin A. Thomas, Executive Director of the Bedford
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, and later President of the Ford Foundation.
12. Id.
13. Broderick testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Roads hearing on
Urban Highways on May 6, 1968, on behalf of the Panel, urging long-term commit-
ments for housing in the same vein as that provided for interstate highway con-
struction. Judge Broderick's analysis of the history of such issues is touched upon
in Riddick v. Summit House, 835 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). His 1968 testi-
mony was followed up in the subsequent discussion of a proposal for a National
Development Bank, which would provide funds for the rebuilding of blighted ar-
eas, but would not require residents to remain in a state of poverty to continue to
live there since it would allow them to pay rents or purchase prices based upon




the Department. In each instance, the meetings were chaired
by Broderick himself. He reported that participants vented an-
ger through frequent loud shouting and expletives, yet the dis-
agreements eventually subsided into rational discussion, and
led to resolution of each dispute.
Broderick believed that past evils must be overcome by fur-
thering an expanding society which can provide greater oppor-
tunity for all to the detriment of none. 14 In his judicial
decisions, he sought to assure that invidious discrimination be
eliminated no matter how sophisticated the devices involved. 15
He held that although an unsuccessful employer explanation for
personnel action did not by itself support a complainant's claim,
if the explanation made no sense, it could support an adverse
inference. 16 At the same time, Broderick insisted that employ-
ment discrimination suits not be permitted to become a vehicle
for other employment controversies, because then they would
undermine the purposes of the laws.'7
B. "Just, Speedy and Inexpensive"'8 Determination of
Every Action
Judge Broderick was one of the few jurists who took Rule
119 seriously. Through persuasion, as well as rulings, he sought
innovative ways to promote its goals.
14. Judge Broderick believed that the Second World War turned out to be one
of the most powerful means of furthering this objective because everyone was
needed - an achievement he believed must be recaptured. See Toliver v. Sullivan
Diagnostic Treatment Center, 818 F. Supp. 71, 73-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
15. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Yonkers, 803 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
16. See, e.g., Stewart v. IBM Corp., 867 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Chorbajian v. Goldhirsch, 814 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Judge Broderick also held that so-called pre-selection of employees for experi-
ence-rich advanced assignments could lead to illegal discrimination if such experi-
ence were a mandatory requirement for subsequent promotion, but otherwise
would not be subject to lawsuits; to rule otherwise would destroy effective conduct
of a viable workplace by making every job assignment subject to litigation. Walker
v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 869 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See
also Walker v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 865 F. Supp. 124, 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
17. See, e.g., Oey v. Delta Airlines, 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1438
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, unpublished opinion 94-7204, #670 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 1994)
(on file in Second Circuit Clerk's Office).





Creating a Positive Atmosphere:
1. The Judge Who Liked Everyone.
One of Judge Broderick's most important tools was the fact
that he liked everybody, even if they behaved objectionably. He
drew a distinction between the person and the behavior. For
example, when anyone claimed to dislike another person Judge
Broderick would instantly insist that he liked that person -
even if he had to take action against some of his or her conduct.
2. Humor as Antidote to Hostility.
Humor was one of Judge Broderick's most effective meth-
ods for overcoming tension or hostility between opposing coun-
sel. For example, at a conference on redistricting, a dispute
arose which pitted Hispanic citizens against municipal authori-
ties. Tempers had reached the boiling point when one of the
Hispanic representatives accused the City of paying attention
only to "Uncle Tom" Hispanics. Judge Broderick leaned back in
his chair, allowed several seconds to pass, and asked in a low
tone, "How does 'Uncle Tom' translate into Spanish?" Everyone
in the room burst out laughing, and soon thereafter friendly
consultations were scheduled, leading to settlement of the en-
tire dispute.
3. Supporting Those Who Commit Ordinary Errors.
Judge Broderick was a firm believer in the importance of
the harmless error concept codified in Rule 61 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and he applied it both in judicial rul-
ings20 and in dealing with people. In one instance, a court clerk
committed an error affecting a written decision, discovered the
error, and suggested that Judge Broderick use the error in the
clerk's office as the explanation when the order was modified.
Judge Broderick's reaction is reported to have been instant and
emphatic refusal to avoid responsibility for the error even
though the error was not his. His response was immediate: "I
will do no such thing!"
20. See, e.g., Sealy v. Shalala, 871 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y 1994); Thomas v.





To seek the "just, speedy, and inexpensive"21 disposition of
every action, the goal of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Judge Broderick developed numerous innovative
procedures, such as:
-Providing a one page orientation statement to all counsel,
stating, in part: Judge Broderick appreciates professionalism
between opposing counsel and recommends that harsh com-
ments orally or in writing concerning opposing parties or attor-
neys be avoided.
-Raising the option of settlement first at all conferences,
seeking solutions, even if outside the initial boundaries of the
dispute, which would benefit the parties as a group, providing
savings or benefits which could be divided so all could accept
them.
-Treating as harmless error all technical deficiencies in ser-
vice where actual notice was received, and similar errors not
causing substantial prejudice, 22 including minor shortfalls in
meeting administratively-imposed governmental deadlines for
submissions.0
-Dismissing government lawsuits where excessive levels of
bureaucracy had led to unconscionable delays.24
-Transferring cases to other districts for convenience more
liberally, because of the expansion of the choices available to
the party who originally filed the suit provided by amendments
to venue statutes.2
-Allowing attorneys to file sur-reply and sur-sur-reply
briefs without further permission - but at their peril, since his
rules made it clear he need not wait for such belated
submissions.26
21. FED. R. Cirv. P. 1.
22. See, e.g., Thomas v. Yonkers Police Dep't, 147 F.R.D. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
23. Compare Sealy v. Shalala, 871 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (excusing
short delay) with Wojik v. Postmaster General, 814 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(dismissing after excessive delay).
24. Dollar Dry Dock Bank v. Denning, 148 F.R.D. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
25. Big Baby v. Schecter, 812 F. Supp. 442, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also In re
Trap Rock, 158 B.R. 574, 575-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
26. This concept was based upon former United States Supreme Court Rule
15, SuP. CT. R. 15 (allowing replies to oppositions to certiorari petitions, but not




-Giving full effect 27 to the Supreme Court's 1986 pronounce-
ment that, if a claim is "implausible," the claimant "must come
forward with more persuasive evidence . . . than otherwise
would be necessary" to avoid summary judgment.28
-Using authority granted by the Supreme Court 29 to require
that parties establish the existence of a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact prior to trial, even if the parties failed to move, and to
require that they do so at the outset of the case if a plaintiff
should be expected to have sufficient facts to fulfill the require-
ment without discovery.
-Declining to rule on motions where the parties have failed
to deal with issues the Judge considered crucial to a just out-
come, and formally reserving decision pending further submis-
sions on subjects outlined by the court.30
-Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 131 to refuse to
permit the retention of natural persons as defendants if a sol-
vent institutional entity is fully responsible.3 2
-Using phased discovery where initial inquiry might shed
light on the need for more burdensome discovery. 33
-Encouraging bench trials with direct testimony by affida-
vit and cross-examination of witnesses whose testimony the
judge found significant.34
-Barring filing of sealed material with the court without
prior permission, thus enhancing public ability to judge the
27. See, e.g., Toliver v. SDTC, 818 F. Supp. 71, 74 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); DeCin-
tio v. Lawrence Hospital, 797 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
28. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
29. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986), discussed in Jacobson v. Co-
hen, 151 F.R.D. 526, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
30. See Star Enterprise v. Apple Valley Service Center, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
32. See Archer v. Globe Motorists Supply Co., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 211, 214
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 851 F. Supp. 543, 546 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
33. Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Cham-
bers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 157 F.R.D. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
34. See Strehle v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd 54
F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 1995).
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work of the judiciary, avoiding side litigation, and avoiding
waste of scarce vault space.3 5
-Using court-appointed experts as an antidote to reliance
on partisan experts, who often earn a large part of their income
by testifying or giving advice concerning litigation.36
-Using an adverse inference as a substitute for formal sanc-
tions against parties or counsel for discovery shortfalls and
other improper behavior, 37 rather than bringing about side liti-
gation and engender unnecessary bitterness. Judge Broderick
felt strongly that monetary sanctions often operated unfairly
against less affluent litigants, who could neither build up large
initial fees to be shifted nor afford to pay monetary sanctions. 38
In some cases, Broderick would treat a private comment, or, if
necessary, a published criticism as a sufficient word to the
wise.39
-Insisting that those bringing private RICO suits for crimi-
nal sanctions establish that a factfinder could reasonably find
the criminal intent necessary to support a criminal conviction.4°
C. Justice as the Goal of Procedure
Judge Broderick resisted litigation techniques such as un-
necessary use of ex parte applications 41 or secrecy, not permit-
35. Levy v. Weksel, 143 F.R.D. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also E.R. Squibb v.
Accident Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 98, 103-104 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
36. E.g., DeAngelis v. A. Tarricone, 151 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Judge
Broderick insisted that all material examined by an expert which might influence
the expert's testimony be revealed to opposing counsel regardless of work product
or similar objections. Murray International v. New York Telephone, No. 912 Civ.
5975, 1993 WL 82531 (S.D.N.Y. March 17, 1993).
37. See Mareno v. Jet Aviation of Am., Inc., 155 F.R.D. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Buozo
v. Citibank, 1993 WL 525114 (S.D.N.Y. 88 Civ. 1446, Dec. 13, 1993).
38. See Riddick v. Summit House, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 137, 146-47 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
39. Jones v. Wide World of Cars, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 132, 138-39 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
40. See Epstein v. Epstein, 159 F.R.D. 420, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Alpert v.
Kramer, 145 F.R.D. 318,320 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also Maglione v. Cedar Hill Cem-
etery, 853 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); United States v. Bryser, 838 F. Supp.
124, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
41. See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 234, 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), later ruling 822 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (establishing strict
limitations on real estate foreclosure without notice, even if authorized by con-
tract); Little Tor Auto Center v. Exxon, 822 F. Supp. 141, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (dis-
9
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ting one-sided use of surreptitious tapes of witnesses taken by
one side under false pretenses. 42 He felt such techniques would
only enhance the sporting aspect of justice. He also disap-
proved of confidentiality agreements between employers and
employees wherein severance pay was exchanged for employee's
silence.4
Judge Broderick believed that justice should take priority
over docket statistics. While seeking to achieve a zero backlog
of fully submitted motions, he declined to press parties to try
cases which none of the litigants wished to pursue. Instead,
Judge Broderick believed that if the parties wished to let a case
lie fallow preparatory to eventual dismissal for lack of prosecu-
tion or by consent, it was a mistake to force them to litigate.
While some judges assume that the duty of a jurist is lim-
ited to resolving disputes between the parties, Judge Broder-
ick's view was broader. He felt that the United States District
Court was the nerve center of our democratic Republic. When
problems reached the point of being called to the court's atten-
tion, Judge Broderick often felt something should be done about
them by consent, or persuasion if possible, or by notifying other
authorities, if necessary.44
II. Juridical Foundations for the Economy for the Twenty-
First Century
Judge Broderick was certain that existing law contained
far more leeway than generally recognized to permit our Repub-
approving effort to obtain temporary restraining order ex parte without evidence of
extreme emergency).
Judge Broderick specifically disapproved ex parte submissions by prosecutors
in criminal cases without application to court with a showing of extraordinary cir-
cumstances. Campbell v. United States, No. 94 Civ. 634, 1994 WL 361606
(S.D.N.Y. July 5, 1994).
For an example of a situation where Judge Broderick approved limited ex
parte practice where any errors could be promptly corrected without prejudice, see
In re Child World, 147 B.R. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), earlier ruling 146 B.R. 89
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
42. Bogan v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 144 F.R.D. 51, 53 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
43. See Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
44. See, e.g., Imperial Chemical Industries, PLC v. Barr Laboratories, 795 F.
Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), judgment but not opinion vacated pursuant to settle-




lic to meet expanding challenges. He sought to clarify such op-
tions when relevant to controversies brought before him.
A. Responsible Stewardship
While ruling that delegation of governmental power to ex-
ercise sovereign compulsion (e.g., breaking into a private build-
ing to save a trapped animal without seeking a warrant) was
unconstitutional, 45 Judge Broderick took the occasion to empha-
size that the totality of our legal rules creates a concept of re-
sponsible stewardship toward the environment. 46 He noted that
Congress had established procedures for defining new technolo-
gies vital to the national interest.47 These technologies aid in
preserving natural habitats critical to biodiversity.4
B. Banking and Currency Power
Judge Broderick learned the importance of the congres-
sional banking and currency power from his father, Joseph A.
Broderick, the first Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board, and
Superintendent of Banks in New York State under Governor
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Unlike regulatory powers, the banking
and currency power permits use of the carrot rather than the
stick to obtain national goals.
That power has long been used to support loans and loan
guarantees for the private sector when vital to the national in-
terest (and hence can be used to support private research and
development which may create new industries, protect the envi-
ronment or protect national defense), based upon long-term
commitments supported by the central bank system.49 Judge
Broderick explained the constitutional validity of such options
when a New Yorker challenged the permissibility of independ-
ent legislatively-created transportation agencies.50 The poten-
tial of these insights for the twenty-first century and the role of
the United Sates in it needs no amplification.
45. Suss v. ASPCA, 823 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
46. Id. at 184-85 n.3.
47. Id. at 185.
48. Id.
49. See Fidata Trust Co. of N.Y. v. FDIC, 826 F. Supp. 105, 106 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).




While seeking to reconcile the rights of state and federal
agencies, and property owners and subsidized tenants,51 Judge
Broderick stressed the currently obscured authority to use long-
term credit for creating a considerable volume of new housing
rather than giving a few people substantial subsidies under
complex bureaucratic controls.52
C. Protecting the National Common Market
Judge Broderick was keenly aware of the threat of local
cartel-like arrangements to the national economy, including
those implemented through abuse of occupational licensing. In
a decision tracing the history of the Federal Commerce
Clause,53 Judge Broderick held that where a supervisor had a
state license, the state could not require a contractor to obtain a
separate state occupational license.54 To so require interfered
with interstate commerce, since it would be difficult to obtain
advance approvals in all of the states as needed to compete in a
nationwide market.55
D. Questioning the Limits of Executive Power to Impose
Tariffs for Retaliatory Purposes
Judge Broderick held that a drastic increase of duties on
tomatoes as retribution for European rejection of hormone
treated U.S. meats under the so-called "Super 301" provision of
U.S. trade laws56 could be challenged in the courts, but not by
resorting to false statements to the Customs Service.57 The de-
cision stated that the imposition of a tax by the Executive might
be contrary to the Origination Clause of the Constitution, 58
which requires revenue measures to originate in the House of
Representatives. 59 Because of the constitutional vulnerability
of the underlying duty if challenged honestly, additional discov-
51. Riddick v. Summit House, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
52. Id. at 141-42.
53. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, ci. 3.
54. Tetra Technologies, Inc. v. Harter, 823 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
55. Id. at 1119.
56. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411, 2483 (West Supp. 1995).
57. United States v. Gulla, 833 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
58. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 7, cl. 1.




ery was provided to the defendants even though charged with
fraudulent mislabelling of tomatoes as tomato sauce.60
III. Fairness Both to Individuals and the Institutional Sector
In controversies between natural persons and institutional
entities, whether public or private, Judge Broderick was con-
scious of both the need for entities to be protected from being to
eaten to the bone by rapacious individuals, and for individuals
to be heard without being caught in procedural traps. For ex-
ample, Judge Broderick disregarded natural persons' uninten-
tional failures to satisfy hyper-technical or specialized service
or other paperwork requirements so long as actual knowledge
was present.61 In one of his earliest landmark decisions, he in-
sisted that an institutional entity (in this instance the United
States) provide reasonable information to those acting to claim
rights or fulfill obligations. 62 In another instance, Broderick
found long-arm jurisdiction available where a holding company
controlling stock option trading in New York sought to escape
responsibility because it was located elsewhere. 63
Judge Broderick held governmental and other institutional
entities to a higher standard of procedural compliance because
of their ability to meet that standard. For example, he dis-
missed a government agency's suit because it was delayed for
an excessive period due to internal bureaucratic levels of ap-
proval for routine actions.6 4 Broderick held that a governmen-
tal agency which misplaced its own files must pay interim
benefits in certain instances. 66 Examples include when the
original claim was filed nearly five years ago and when the wel-
fare of a child is at stake.6 Where a government agency alleg-
edly acts arbitrarily in exercising sovereign compulsion, Judge
Broderick believed that judicial review should be available. 67
60. Id.
61. See Thomas v. Yonkers Police Dep't, 147 F.R.D. 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
62. See Becker v. Blum, 464 F. Supp. 152, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
63. Bellomo v. Pennsylvania Life, 488 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
64. Dollar Dry Dock Bank v. Denning, 148 F.R.D. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
65. Davila v. Shalala, 848 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
66. Id.
67. See Pyramid Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 150, 152
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); United States v. Local 6A, 832 F. Supp. 674, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
1996] 223
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Judge Broderick refused to allow consumers, often less
knowledgeable, to be taken advantage of by the use of difficult-
to-understand documents with inequitable provisions.68 He also
rejected attempts by sophisticated or affluent litigants to take
unfair advantage of procedural complexities,6 9 one sided legal
doctrines, 70 or routinely asserted doubtful jurisdictional objec-
tions.71 Judge Broderick rejected attempts to justify the South-
ern District of New York as a forum for a case because expert
witnesses in a technical area were concentrated in the district.7 2
He also refused to permit government agencies to remove cases
to forums other than those where a lawsuit was originally
brought merely because another venue was permissible.73
In the crucial area of debt collection, Broderick held that
the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act of 19907 was persua-
sive authority in other debt collection suits under state or
federal law.75 To ensure its availability, Judge Broderick incor-
68. See IBM Credit Corp. v. United Home for Aged Hebrews, 848 F. Supp.
495, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Jones v. Wide World of Cars, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 132, 137
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Estate of Sheradsky v. West One Bank, Oregon, 817 F. Supp. 423,
425 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Morgan v. McNiff, 797 F. Supp. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
69. Tight deadlines imposed by administrative action were held subject to
harmless error analysis under FED. R. Cirv. P. 61 in, e.g., Sealy v. Shalala, 871 F.
Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Wojik v. Postmaster General, 814 F. Supp. 8, 9
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). On the other hand, institutional entities with well-funded legal
resources were held to a tighter standard. See Dollar Dry Dock Bank v. Denning,
148 F.R.D. 124, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (involving delay in FDIC litigation due to ex-
cessive levels of review within the agency).
In Cruz v. Sullivan, 802 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D.N.Y 1992), Judge Broderick
held that a governmental date record relied upon to assert untimeliness of a citi-
zen claim was subject to challenge as to reliability.
70. For a corrective of one such position - use of boilerplate language requir-
ing a person retrieving a forfeited asset to pay unlimited governmental costs if a
surprise third party makes a later claim, see United States v. 163 Renwick Street,
No. 93 Civ. 2924, WL 594717 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1994). See also United States v.
163 Renwick Street, 859 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
71. See Barbieri v. Hartsdale Post Office, 856 F. Supp. 817, 819 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); United States v. Galu, 812 F. Supp. 19, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 999 F.2d
537 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a person found incompetent could nevertheless
assert claims not requiring a full evidentiary trial).
72. Max Planck Gesellschaft Zur Foederung Der Wissenschaften v. General
Elec. Co., 858 F. Supp. 380, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
73. Ullah v. FDIC, 852 F. Supp. 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
74. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3008 (1994).
75. Schueler v. Roman Asphalt Corp., 827 F. Supp. 247, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y.





porated into one of his decisions the full text of a hitherto un-
available section-by-section analysis of the predecessor of that
Act, as submitted to the Senate Judiciary by the Department of
Justice.76
Judge Broderick also emphasized actual impartiality in the
selection of decision makers in disputes purporting to be re-
solved by a neutral party.77 Examples include the evaluation of
childrens educational programs 78 and disputes under ERISA.79
Broderick insisted on careful examination of applications
for ex parte receiverships whether agreed upon by contract or
not, for ex parte temporary restraining orders,80 and other irrev-
ocable or emergency relief. If granted, such orders were limited
to what was clearly necessary. Broderick almost always deleted
large amounts of boilerplate submitted by the applicants,
whether governmental or private."'
Judge Broderick also insisted that repairs to dilapidated
properties take precedence over payments to creditors in dispo-
sition of rents or other funds obtained by a foreclosing re-
ceiver.8 2 In addition, Broderick's orders protected receivers
from individual lawsuits and barred litigation against them in
their personal capacity.83
A. Equally Important: Protecting Institutional Entities
Judge Broderick considered institutional entities in a tech-
nological society to be both absolutely necessary and extremely
dangerous unless carefully monitored by the citizenry. Recog-
76. Schueler v. Rayjas Enterprises, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1147 at 1149.
77. See, e.g., Heldman v. Sobol, 846 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Derico v.
IBM Corp., No. 93 Civ. 0823, 1993 WL 106799 (S.D.N.Y. April 6, 1993); Shea v.
Road Carriers Local 707 Welfare Fund, 818 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Howe v.
CNA Ins. Co., No. 92 Civ. 7762, 1994 WL 98745 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 1994).
78. Heldman v. Sobol, 846 F. Supp. at 288-89.
79. Derico v. IBM Corp., No. 93 Civ. 0823, 1993 WL 106799; Shea v. Road
Carriers Local 707 Welfare Fund, 818 F. Supp. 631; Howe v. CNA Ins. Co., No. 92
Civ. 7762, 1994 WL 98745.
80. See Little Tor Auto Center v. Exxon Corp., 822 F. Supp. 141 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
81. See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Spark Tarrytown, Inc., 813 F.
Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
82. See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. S.E.A. Yonkers Assocs., 869 F.
Supp. 187, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).





nizing the importance of protecting institutions as well as indi-
viduals, Judge Broderick granted summary judgment for
defendants in numerous suits he found nonmeritorious once the
facts were known.8 4 He suggested criteria that institutions
could consider as means to avoid potential liability.8 5
Judge Broderick believed that those who were denied or
were losing government contracts or grants had no standing un-
less it was created by statute or contract provisions.8 6 He also
believed that employees who acted in ways that threatened
others could not use the legal system to penalize employers for
their dismissal.8 7
Broderick drew upon the prohibition of lawsuits between
members of the armed forces concerning acts taken in the line
of duty. Following that model, he insisted that law enforcement
officers engaged in lawsuits against each other present the mat-
ter to their supervisors and their unions, rather than ask the
courts to adjudicate their dispute.88
Judge Broderick also questioned the assumption that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires state or local public sector en-
tities acting solely in a proprietary, rather than sovereign, ca-
pacity to be subject to any greater restrictions on contracting
and personnel actions than are private entities.8 9 Cases involv-
ing invidious discrimination, he pointed out, are already cov-
84. See, e.g. Oey v. Delta Airlines, 93 Civ 3256, 1994 WL 24656, 64 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd unpublished opinion 94-7204 #670
(2d Cir. August 12, 1994) (on file in 2d Cir. Clerk's office).
85. A. and B. v. C. College and D., 863 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (involving
academic disciplinary procedures for alleged student sexual misconduct); Gottlieb
v. County of Orange, 871 F. Supp. 625, 630-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (demanding that
parent leave home in child sexual abuse action).
86. Intercommunity Relations Council of Rockland County, Inc. v. United
States Dep't. of Health and Human Services, 859 F. Supp. 81, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
87. See, e.g., Taormina v. International Union, 798 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (involving dismissal of a guard at nuclear facility who failed to inspect all
segments of facility after sounding of alarm); DeCintio v. Lawrence Hospital, 797
F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (involving alleged sexual insults to co-worker in hos-
pital setting).
88. Brown v. Westchester, 840 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
89. Watkins v. McConologue, 820 F. Supp. 70, 72 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd,
978 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1992); see also New York State Bar Association, Task Force
on Simplification of the Law, Introduction to Federalist Papers for the Twenty-First




ered by statute, and also touch sovereign roles of public sector
entities, as do acts contrary to the First Amendment."°
B. Robust Treatment as an Advantage to Its Recipient
Judge Broderick believed that ruling against an institution,
public or private, frequently benefitted the losing party by forci-
bly calling its attention to problems which could cause even
greater difficulties later if left unattended. The most highly
publicized example was his ruling dismissing a Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation suit as receiver of a bank because multi-
ple levels of bureaucratic approvals required for even routine
actions led to unacceptable delay.91
C. Balancing Openness and Privacy
Judge Broderick adamantly rejected the common practice
of routinely sealing large amounts of material submitted to the
court, because doing so deprived the public of ability to evaluate
the work of the judiciary.9 2 At the same time, he frequently
omitted the names of natural persons, and at times even enti-
ties, that might be unduly injured by written decisions when
their disclosure served no legal purpose.9 3
IV. Fair and Effective Criminal Justice
The intense nationwide concern over criminal justice
makes Judge Broderick's contribution to this area of law partic-
ularly important at this point in our national history. Broder-
ick influenced criminal law in four major ways: his work as
Chair of the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States from October 1990 to October 1993,
his brief but extremely eventful service as Police Commissioner
90. Watkins v. McConologue, 820 F. Supp. 70, 72 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
91. Dollar Dry Dock Bank v. Denning, 148 F.R.D. 124, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
see also Task Force on Simplification of the Law, New York State Bar Assoc., In-
terim Report #1, Internal Bureaucratic Structure of Agencies (1986).
92. See, E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 98,
103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Levy v. Weksel, 143 F.R.D. 54, 58 (1992).
93. See, e.g., Christiana v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 839 F. Supp. 248, 250
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (omitting names of nonparty employees in employment dis-
crimination case); A. and B. v. C. College and D., 863 F. Supp. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (omitting all names when case settled, but nature and background of settle-




of the City of New York in 1965-66, his judicial decisions, and
his writings and Bar Association work.
Judge Broderick's most basic belief concerning criminal jus-
tice was that fairness and effectiveness were interdependent
rather than counter to each other.94 Roger Bennett Adler, Esq.,
in a letter to the New York Law Journal of March 8, 1995, com-
mented on Broderick's approach to criminal justice:
Notwithstanding the assumption that Judge Broderick's back-
ground as a former New York City Police Commissioner would
make him an apologist for government law enforcement, the judge
was "down the middle" and just as important, perceived as com-
mitted only to inspiring a fair trial for both sides .... Like a great
baseball umpire, he called them as he saw them .... 95
Judge Broderick's passionate impartiality led him to es-
chew hypertechnical objections raised to protect criminal activi-
ties.96 At the same time, he insisted that defendants have
access to government documents not kept confidential for genu-
ine reasons.97
Broderick also insisted that the level of crime found today
could be dealt with effectively only if underlying causes were
confronted. The underlying causes, as he saw them, included
absence of sufficient jobs for those wishing to work 98 and over-
coming evils of past invidious discrimination. At the same time,
he insisted with realism and equal fervor that protection from
crime was necessary.
For some 100 years some of our citizens have been deprived of
social, political and economic rights which are guaranteed them
by the Constitution of the United States .... Our conscience as a
94. See Statement of Vincent L. Broderick, Measures Relating to Organized
Crime: Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crimi-
nal Laws and Procedures, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 219-29 (1969).
95. Robert Bennett Adler, Esq., N.Y.L.J. March 8, 1995 at 2.
96. Stewart v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying drug
dealers equal protection claim because crime victims in minority area have greater
claims on those principles); United States v. Stevenson, 803 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding that car thief lacks privacy expectation concerning car's identifying
number); United States v. Mongelli, 794 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that
monetary criteria under bribery statute concerning use of federal funds embraces
value of consideration for the bribe).
97. United States v. Zanfordino, 833 F. Supp. 429, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
98. Toliver v. Sullivan Diagnostic Center, 818 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see
supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
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nation has been aroused by these inequalities and inequities..
the striving for change... must take place in a climate of law and
social order.
It has been, it is and it will be the primary function of the
police to foster such a climate. The alternative is chaos. And it is
essential... that nothing be done to deter the Police Department
and its individual members from resolutely discharging their duty
of providing such a climate of law and social order.99
Although he did not accept the argument that one's difficulties
in life, however caused, could become an excuse for crime, Judge
Broderick recognized the importance of taking action to remove
impediments holding anyone back or making crime an attrac-
tive option to some.
A. Flexible Sentences
Judge Broderick's belief in purpose interpretation'00 of
legal concepts, and his conviction that fair and effective law en-
forcement were interrelated, made him a passionate crusader
against rigidity in sentencing. He never tired of pointing out
that mandatory minimum sentences were harmful rather than
helpful to law enforcement. Such mandates lead to fewer con-
victions because they are nullified by judges, juries and appel-
late courts who may find a way to acquit a defendant if the
sentence seems unduly harsh.
According to Broderick, sentencing guidelines should be
just that - guidelines, not rules of law. He believed that courts
can and should depart from the guidelines whenever unforeseen
aspects of a case come to light. He expressed his conviction per-
99. Statement of Police Commissioner Vincent L. Broderick before the Com-
mittee on City Affairs, City Council, June 29, 1975 at 1. See United States v. Ste-
venson, 829 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
In this ringing statement as Police Commissioner, Broderick also insisted that
he as a civilian commissioner was responsible for disciplining the force and that a
separate civilian police review board would merely undermine that function. Id.
100. Purpose interpretation was described as follows by Chief Justice Stone,
one of the jurists Judge Broderick particularly revered:
"To decide, we turn to the words of the [document involved, in this instance,
the Constitution] read in their historical setting as revealing the purposes of its
framers, and search for admissible meanings of its words, which, in the circum-
stances of their application, will effectuate those purposes." United States v. Clas-





suasively at numerous gatherings, through testimony before
the Sentencing Commission, and through a series of published
decisions implementing a large variety of options (none of which
were appealed). 10 1
Broderick undertook a personal crusade against rigid appli-
cation of mandatory minimum penalties which ignored individ-
ual circumstances. 10 2 Judge Broderick succeeded in securing
opposition to such minimums on the part of the entire federal
judiciary, as he testified before the House Judiciary Commit-
tee's Subcommittee on Crime on July 28, 1994: "I am here to
express the complete and unmitigated opposition of the federal
judges of this country to mandatory minimums."' 03
Faced by this solidity of federal judicial opposition to rigid
minimums, Congress passed Title Eight of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)),
permitting departures from mandatory minimums under speci-
fied circumstances. 0 4 These circumstances include a require-
ment of full disclosure of relevant information by the defendant
in lieu of the need to obtain a "5K1" letter from the prosecution
101. See, e.g., United States v. Caruso, 814 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (al-
lowing downward departure from sentencing guidelines where candy store opera-
tor was sole actor in local gambling activity grossing $20,000 annually); United
States v. Gaind, 829 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (allowing downward departure
because of partial fulfillment of purposes of sentencing where defendant would be
unable to commit further crimes of the only type he was likely to be tempted or
able to commit and lost his business and livelihood); United States v. Lieberman,
839 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding Gaind inapplicable and denying down-
ward departure where pharmacist prosecuted for narcotics violation, since loss of
pharmacy business would not necessarily preclude recurrence of criminal activity);
United States v. Martin, 827 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (basing downward de-
parture upon voluntary participation in shock incarceration ("boot camp") pro-
gram); United States v. Neiman, 828 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting
downward departure from guidelines based upon likelihood of rehabilitation in
non-narcotics context where religious leaders and family members agreed to su-
pervise home confinement and medical treatment was to be provided); United
States v. Stevenson, 829 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting reduction in crimi-
nal history by eliminating points for conviction involving minor amount of mari-
juana secured for defendant's own use).
102. For a summary of Judge Broderick's views, see Vincent L. Broderick, The
Delusion of Mandatory Sentencing, TRIAL, Aug. 1994, at 62.
103. Id.





attesting to substantial assistance in prosecuting others.10 5 Be-
cause of Broderick's critical role, Title Eight could well be
known as the "Broderick Act."10 6
In Shendur v. United States,10 7 the first substantive re-
ported decision interpreting Title Eight, Judge Broderick
quoted Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 78 as follows:
[I]t is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that
the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard
[against] injury ... by unjust and partial laws. Here also the
firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in miti-
gating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. 10 8
Judge Broderick also set forth the first comprehensive anal-
ysis of the interpretations of Title Eight.0 9
At least as important as these efforts was Judge Broderick's
development of means to make it more likely that sentencing
discretion would be exercised wisely. Probation officers' reports
and observations indicate that Broderick developed a unique
practice of holding a detailed, private but on-the-record sentenc-
ing conference in his robing room. During these conferences, he
discussed the sentence with defense counsel, the defendant in
person if such informal allocution was desired, and prosecution
counsel. Immediately thereafter, he consulted the probation of-
ficer involved and his staff behind closed doors. Only after full
discussion did he ascend the bench, conduct formal allocution,
provide necessary warnings in open court, and impose the sen-
tence itself. 10
In Judge Broderick's opinion, reference to harsh sentences
or other rulings by state judges in re-election campaigns created
the appearance, and at times the reality, of distorting the im-
105. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5K1.1 (West 1993) (allowing depar-
tures from guidelines under specific conditions).
106. Judge Broderick opposed any rigid restrictions on individualized sen-
tencing, and would have objected to subsequent tightening of threshold require-
ments for exercise of discretion.
107. 874 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
108. Id. at 86-7.
109. Vincent L. Broderick, Flexible Sentencing and the Violent Crime Control
Act of 1994, 7 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER 128 (Nov./Dec. 1994) (now reprinted
as an appendix to United States v. Vargas, 885 F. Supp. 504, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).





partiality of rulings in order to please the public in the short
run. While he did not vacate a conviction challenged through a
federal habeas corpus claim, he did issue a warning that contin-
uance of such a practice might have that result."'
Judge Broderick was deeply concerned that criminal justice
was being distorted by excessive dependence on unreliable in-
formants and undercover agents, and cooperating defendants
often guilty of more serious crimes than those they testify
against. 1 2 He repeatedly urged a profound re-examination of
criminal justice, including current interpretations of constitu-
tional provisions. 1 3
Perhaps the most salient suggestion made by Judge Brod-
erick is his call for reconsideration of current constructions of
the term "compelled" in the Fifth Amendment. He believed that
the text and purposes of the Amendment might be fulfilled if an
adverse inference from silence were permitted, so long as safe-
guards were provided, including:
* Absence of any contempt or perjury sanctions;
* Presence of counsel;
* A transcript of the proceedings;
* Questioning limited to what the person did or observed
(not what the person thought)."14
Judge Broderick also suggested that there may be a federal
defense of self-defense implicit in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clauses. 15 Such a defense could pro-
tect the right of citizens to defend themselves against crime
without facing prosecution. 116 The boundaries of such a defense
were not explored because the facts of the case involved did not
ultimately support the applicability of the defense. 117
111. Brown v. Doe, 803 F. Supp. 932, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), later ruling 811 F.
Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd 2 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir. 1993).
112. See Solis v. Walker, 799 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
113. See Statement of Vincent L. Broderick, Measures Relating to Organized
Crime, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws & Procedures, Senate
Judiciary Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 219-29 (1969).
114. Id. See also Theriot v. Senkowski, 802 F. Supp. 1081, 1083 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). Judge Broderick also favored alternatives to the exclusionary rule in regard
to improperly obtained evidence. See Testimony, supra; Suss v. A.S.P.C.A., 823 F.
Supp. 181, 191 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).






Judge Broderick wished to avoid useless consumption of
time in state courts and of counsel for prisoners, as well as to
discourage vain hopes of pro se petitioners. He therefore con-
sistently sought to rule on the merits of petitions for federal
habeas corpus relief by state prisoners, even if state remedies
had not been exhausted, if the petition would ultimately be de-
nied on the merits in any event.118
V. The Role of the Bar
Judge Broderick was intensely aware of the potential of the
Bar for improving the law. One of his most important contribu-
tions in his roles as a Bar leader and as Chair of the New York
County Lawyers Committee on Federal Legislation was his rec-
ommendation for a provision included in the Alaska Pipeline
Act, Public Law 93-153 § 408, 87 Stat. 5762 (1973), which be-
came 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), authorizing the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to obtain permanent injunctions in proper cases."19 This
single clause has been deemed by some to be the single most
important consumer protection law.12o
Judge Broderick also sought to prevent abuses by attorneys
which could reflect negatively on the Bar as a whole. He de-
clined to authorize additional fees for multiple law firms repre-
senting plaintiffs in class actions.' 2 ' He also reduced legal fees
in a class action where current stockholders would both pay for
(through reduction of the company's assets) and receive a signif-
icant portion of the settlement. 2 2 Similarly, he questioned the
propriety and binding nature of legal ethics rules designed to
118. See, e.g., United States ex rel. John v. People, 868 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1995) (temporary restraining orders, preliminary
injunctions).
120. See, e.g., Cornell, Federal Trade Commission Permanent Injunction Ac-
tions Against Unfair and Deceptive Practices: The Proper Case and the Proper
Proof, 61 ST. JoIN's L. REV. 503, 505-06 (1987). See also, Strenio, Why Thirteen
Should Be a Lucky Number for Victims of Price Fixing, 57 ANTrrRUST L.J. 149
(1988).
121. Bernstein v. Presidential Life, No. 92 Civ. 6968, 1993 WL 43559
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1993); Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994 WL 716025
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1994).





protect attorneys' financial positions rather than to protect the
public. 123
Judge Broderick took a dim view of charges by adversaries
that opposing counsel suffered from a conflict of interest. 124 He
believed that such conflicts were also subject to harmless error
principles.125 He strongly disapproved the use of "retaining
liens" to permit an attorney to hold a client's file as security for
fees, and held that such arrangements were barred in federal
cases under Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.126
VI. "The Best Court in the Country Bar None"
United States District Judge Edward Weinfeld, often con-
sidered the best trial judge in the country during his lifetime, 127
was frequently asked if he was saddened by never having been
nominated to sit on the Supreme Court of the United States.
His answer was always in the negative, stating that he was sit-
ting in "the greatest court in the country, bar none."2 8
Judge Broderick also believed that the trial court was the
most important court, for it is in the trial court that justice has
the most direct and extensive effect on people's lives. Direct in-
teraction with people, and the ability to help by listening, by
bringing wisdom to bear in developing mutually beneficial solu-
tions, was, to him, the most important part of his professional
life.
Judge Broderick repeatedly made it clear that the absence
of binding effect of District Court decisions upon any other
judge was of no interest to him. Rather, he counted on the per-
123. See id.; see also McGrane v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc., 822 F. Supp.
1044, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
124. United States v. Thompson, 803 F. Supp. 905, 907-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
United States v. Bryser, 803 F. Supp. 908, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
125. Id.
126. Fontaine v. Ryan, 849 F. Supp. 242, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Misek-Falkoff
v. IBM Corp., 829 F. Supp 660, 663-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
127. The widely revered Judge Weinfeld sat for almost four decades until
1988, bringing forth such evaluations as "When you're in his court, you know
you're before the bar of justice." Editorial Desk, The Devotion of Judge Weinfeld,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1988 at A26; see also William E. Nelson, Judge Weinfeld and
the Adjudicatory Process: A Law Finder in an Age of Judicial Lawmakers, 50
N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 (1975).
128. Arnold H. Lubasch, Judge Edward Weinfeld, 86, Dies; On United States
Bench Nearly Four Decades, N.Y. TmEs, Jan. 18, 1988, at A16 (emphasis added).
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suasive power of his opinions to establish their place in
history.129
129. See IBM Credit Corp. v. United Home for Aged Hebrews, 848 F. Supp.
495, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
25
